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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Nature and Justification of the Problem 
Divestiture, according to Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary (Gave, 1976, p. 663), means "the compulsory transfer of title 
or disposal of interests (as stock in a corporation) upon government 
order." This is the legal term for what occurred on January 1, 1984 when 
the American Telephone and Telegragh (AT&T) monopoly was dissolved. This 
divestiture was the result of the largest antitrust suit in history, a 
'suit filed by the United States Justice Department in 1974. At the time 
of the breakup AT&T was the biggest company in the world. Its assets of 
$150 billion accounted for almost 4% of the total assets of the 500 
companies listed as the largest in the country. The size of the company 
and its monopolistic tendencies opened it to scrutiny from regulators. 
The Justice Department filed its first lawsuit against AT&T in 
January 1949 alleging that AT&T violated the Sherman Antitrust Act. The 
government demanded that AT&T's subsidiary Western Electric be separated 
from the Bell System (Seelman, 1984) . A compromise was reached whereby 
limiting AT&T's communications activities while making patents available 
for all. In return AT&T was allowed to retain Western Electric. In 
November 1974, the Justice Department filed its second suit, once again 
citing the Sherman Antitrust Act; this suit, ending in 1982, resulted in 
the breakup decree. Officially starting January 1, 1984 AT&T was divided 
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into eight separate entities. AT&T assumed the role of providing long-
distance service while the seven remaining entities fulfilled the local 
service. In exchange, all were allowed into otherwise prohibited 
enterprise areas (Baida, 1985) . But was the public interest served by the 
divestiture? Did the consumer benefit from the breakup? Has the breakup 
affected the consumers' rates and service? Is the consumer still 
confused? 
Purpose of the Report 
The purpose of this report is to explore the current literature 
concerning the AT&T divestiture to determine if, in fact, the divestiture 
has benefited the consumer, AT&T, and/or the government. It is written 
from a neutral standpoint rather than taking an industry or consumer 
focus. The information and quotations are not meant to reflect the views 
of the author, but rather to put the information in such a way the reader 
can draw his/her own conclusions of the effects and benefits of the 
divestiture. This information can be used by consumers to clarify just 
what did happen in the breakup, why it happened, and how the telephone 
industry is now structured. Often times when an individual has a better 
understanding of why a certain event occurred they are better able to 
cope with problems that might arise from the event. Hopefully, this study 
will provide the reader with such an understanding. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
History of AT&T 
"The most drastic discontinuity in the history of any major U.S. 
industry," or even "the largest corporate event in history," the breakup 
of the biggest and quite possibly the best, example of industrial 
organization in the world: the American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
(AT&T) (Toffler, 1985, p. 6) . With this statement Toffler gives a glimpse 
of what the AT&T divestiture meant to the company, the government, the 
public, and the world itself. AT&T was unquestionably one of the great 
corporations in history. Toffler states that unlike the banking empires 
of the Middle Ages or the great trading companies of the Mercantile Age, 
AT&T was born into the Industrial Age. Its enormous success sprang from a 
profound understanding of the social environment in which it had to 
operate. Theodore Vail and the other founders of the Bell System knew, 
whether intuitively or consciously, where the industrial system was 
heading and what made it tick. Knowing these things, they were able to 
shape AT&T into an institution perfectly adapted to its time and place. 
That is, it was perfectly adapted in a business sense, however, it failed 
to observe the governmental constraints put forth in the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. To understand this unique company and examine why it was 
dismantled, the initial concept and structure needs to be examined. 
Alexander Graham Bell had great vision for his invention of the 
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telephone even in its early stages. He clearly foresaw a universal 
communications network, and what this network would involve. In a letter 
written in 1878, he spelled out the details with remarkable accuracy: 
It is conceivable that cables of telephone wires could be laid 
underground or suspended overhead, communicating by branch 
wires with private dwellings ... I believe in the future ... a man 
in one part of the country may communicate.with another in a 
distant place (Pool, 1981, p. 156). 
Bell and his supporters believed in his system and this new invention 
that would carry Bell's new company to heights never before dreamed of. 
His early supporters were a merchant named Thomas Sanders and a prominent 
Boston lawyer named Gardiner Greene Hubbard. These two Massachusetts men 
had capital to invest and in 1875 signed a written agreement with Bell 
whereby furnishing half the money for Bell to work on inventions related 
to telegraphy (Baida, 1985). In return for their investment the three men 
would share any resulting patents. 
On the morning of February 14, 1876, Hubbard filed the patent 
application on Bell's behalf for his new invention, the telephone (Baida, 
1985}. U.S. Patent No. 174,465 , generally considered the most valuable 
patent ever issued, was granted to Alexander Graham Bell on March 7, 
1876; Bell was twenty-nine years old. On July 9, 1877, the early written 
agreement known as the Bell Patent Association was superseded by the Bell 
Telephone Company with Hubbard as trustee in full charge of business 
affairs. In the year that Gardiner Greene Hubbard was trustee, he made 
two notable contributions (Seelman, 1984) . The first contribution, was 
that, instead of selling telephones, National Bell, as the company was 
known, would lease them to licensed parties for a royalty. This leasing 
and licensing system led to the basic premise AT&T would follow 
throughout its growth: instead of selling telephones National Bell 
would sell "service." 
Hubbard's second contribution was the hiring of Theodore Vail. 
According to Baida (1985), Vail was a man of great vision and drive. He 
was made the general manager of a new company that was formed to handle 
the business development of the telephone. When Vail began work as 
general manager on July 1, 1878, there were approximately ten thousand 
Bell telephones in service. Wnen he retired in 1919, there were nearly 
eight million. 
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A significant event, one that would shape the telecommunications 
industry for the next three-quarters of a century, took place for the new 
company in 1879. National Bell won a patent infringement case against its 
chief competitor, Western Union. Western Union agreed to get out of the 
telephone business and turn over its facilities to National Bell. In 
exchange Western Union would receive 20% of National Bell's receipts from 
telephone rentals. As a result, the settlement gave National Bell a 
monopoly in the telephone business in the United States and laid ground 
for a merger of AT&T and Western Union. 
Theodore Vail became the first president of the new company 
organized and incorporated in 1885 called the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company. Under its charter, the mission was one of long-
distance service and in its first 15 years AT&T was commonly called the 
Long Distance Company (Baida, 1985) . The corporate charter embodied a 
vision of a global telecommunications system as did Vail 1 s ideas for when 
the Bell patents would expire. "What we wanted to do," he said later, 
"was get possession of the field in such a way that, patent or no patent, 
we could control it" (p. 71) . 
The early 1900s might have been a prognosis of what to expect from 
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the future 1984 divestiture. As the patents expired more than a thousand 
local exchanges were established throughout the country. Many towns had 
two telephone companies and two systems; a few had three (Seelman, 1984). 
As the consumer found out then and as similarly occurred in the 1980s, 
this increased competition resulted in lower prices just as economics 
texts say they should (Jaffe, Schlesinger, and Stertz, 1986) . "Economic 
theory says that businesses are better at making efficient decisions than 
government ... Efficiency, the theory goes, cuts costs, which cut prices" 
(Jaffe, Schlesinger, and Stertz, 1986, p. 1). Regardless of lower prices, 
Pool (1981) says this increased competition also created waste, 
inconvenience, and confusion for the consumer. 
AT&T displayed astounding growth and innovations during the 1920s. 
The company was an early pioneer in every facet of the new communica-
tions media: radio, television, and sound pictures. AT&T, by 1929, was 
the first corporation to generate annual revenues of more than $1 
billion. However, in a series of famous essays (DeMott, 1983), Vail put 
forth the idea that fatter profits are not the be-all and end-all of a 
corporation. Service counts more, he wrote, " ... and the Bell System could 
deliver it best by being a regulated monopoly that struck a balance 
between public and private interests" (p.62). Vail sounded the motto in 
1908 that dominated AT&Ts position until the current divestiture: "One 
system, one policy, universal service" (p. 62). 
Vail set the standards for the AT&T operating companies that would 
make them a juggernaut during the first 50 years of the twentieth 
century, but that also led to competitive sluggishness in the 1960s and 
1970s (Seelman, 1984) . He established a unified research and development 
operation (Bell Laboratories), and built a strong central staff of 
managerial generalists. He insisted that the companies coordinate their 
7 
business policies and adhere to uniform technical standards. These 
standards proved to be inadequate for the revolution in telecommunica-
tions with the ever changing marketing, new technology and the subsequent 
increased competition in the field (Toffler, 1985). 
Monopoly to Vail meant that AT&T would have U.S. telephone service 
mostly to itself in exchange for submitting its rates to federal and 
state regulatory authorities for approval (DeMott, 19831. Vail saw "no 
serious objection" to this regulation provided it was "independent, 
intelligent, considerate, thorough, and just" (Baida, 1985, p. 73). On 
the other hand, he did object to government ownership. "All monopolies 
should be regulated," Vail said. "Government ownership would be an 
unregulated monopoly" (p. 74). Vail saw the telephone industry as a 
natural monopoly, whose strong centralized organization, common theme and 
single minded goal would best serve the public. A private telephone 
monopoly with its unique telephone carrier lines, maintenance, switching 
centers, policy making, price structure, etc, being established and 
monitored from a central command structure would minimize any waste while 
maximizing efficiency. Competition on the other hand according to Vail 
would produce nothing but waste and inefficiency as was demonstrated when 
the Bell patents expired. However, government ownership, not private 
ownership, of telecommunications industries, operating as unregulated 
monopolies, tends to be the standard throughout the world. As Kleinfield 
(1981, p. 4) says, "In a country indissolubly wedded to free enterprise, 
AT&T stands as a corporate enigma, being a regulated monopoly and the 
only major phone company in the world not owned and run by a national 
government." The one time the government nationalized the telephone and 
telegraph companies during World War I, long-distance rates rose 20%, 
local rates went up, and AT&T operated at a·deficit of $13 million 
8 
dollars (Baida, 1985) . 
In July, 1934, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) was 
replaced by the Interstate Commerce Commission as the agency with 
jurisdiction over telecommunications. It promptly launched an investiga-
tion of AT&T. The Commission recognized AT&T as a monopoly, regulated 
under the Communications Act of 1934. Seelman (1984) reports the Act 
instructs the FCC, state and public service commissions, and the 
telephone industry to interact and provide universal telephone service 
regardless of how profitable a customer is to serve. This goal according 
to Johnson: 
... has been realized largely through the implementation of three 
strategies: monopoly, cost averaging, which has afforded cross-
subsidization among routes and services; and a single system 
responsible for provisions of end-to-end service to ensure 
efficiency and reliability (1978, p. 127). 
Today, with universal service achieved, regulators, legislators and 
the courts have looked more and more to competition, rather than 
regulation, to decide what services and equipment will be provided and 
how they should be priced. The Bell System had operated a truly national 
system, accessible to all, at a very low cost (Guinn; 1984). It was run 
with a degree of efficiency that was recognized around the world as the 
standard of excellence in telecommunications. Yet, if the AT&T system was 
as good as Guinn indicates, why was AT&T broken up? Before exploring that 
question it must first be established what happened as a result of 
divestiture. 
Divestiture: What Happened 
"In all Industrial history, whether in the U.S. or the world, no 
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company has undergone a more complex and excruciating process of 
restructure" (Toffler, 1985, p. 6). With this quote, Toffler set the tone 
for what took place on January 1, 1984. The word divestiture, according 
to Baida seems inadequate as a description of the corporate equivalent of 
a "many-limbed giant ripping off limb after limb, flinging the pieces in 
all directions, and leaving the landscape littered with big, bleeding 
hunks of its former self" (1985, p. 65). 
The divestiture of AT&T was not something that took place over night 
or over a year. The first lawsuit, filed by the U.S. Attorney General in 
January, 1949 alleged that AT&T had violated the Sherman Antitrust Act 
and asked that its' immense manufacturing subsidiary, the Western 
Electric Company, be separated from the Bell System (Seelman, 1984). The 
suit was settled in January, 1956 by a consent decree that spelled out 
terms that both the government and AT&T declared to be acceptable. In the 
end, AT&T agreed to confine its activities to common carrier communica-
tion services and government projects, to manufacture only products 
needed by Bell companies and by the government, to make all its existing 
patents available to anyone without charge, and to make all future 
patents available on reasonable terms. In exchange for these concessions, 
the government allowed the company to keep Western Electric. 
Although AT&T claimed a moral victory, the government had put AT&T 
on notice that they were being watched closely. This scrutiny did not 
seem to deter AT&T in its drive in conquering new frontiers. As its Bell 
Laboratories turned out patents at an ever increasing rate, the company's 
profits grew accordingly. In 1972, however, Fortune magazine (Toffler, 
1985) reported that stockholders' equity and higher profit margins began 
to shrink. They concluded, according to Toffler, that "the largest 
companies have exceeded the size at which their operations would yield 
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optimum profit, i.e., that size increasingly involves diseconomies of 
scale 11 (1985, p. 122). In other words, the largest corporations, to 
include AT&T, had grown too large to be efficient and cost effective. 
During this same time period, Toffler submitted his contracted report to 
AT&T, titled Social Dynamics and the Bell System (Toffler, 1985). His 
mission was to study AT&T and determine where their "new direction" 
should be. The report essentially stated AT&T should breakup its system 
so as to be a more competitive force in the exploding telecommunications 
industry. "While it seemed unlikely that top management was going to 
react officially to it, Xerox copies began to circulate unofficially 
through management. It became a [samizdat] document - a piece of 
dissident literature" (p. 12). 
The Justice Department filed its second suit in November, 1974 again 
citing the Sherman Act charging AT&T, Western Electric and Bell 
Laboratories with conspiracy to monopolize the telecommunications 
industry. The monopolization was "accomplished thru an abuse of market 
power in the equipment and service telecommunications market" (Enis and 
Sullivan, 1985, p. 128). In 1978 the FCC ordered competition for regular 
service of long-distance as well as private line service. This initial 
long-distance telephone competition was mainly artificial according to 
Welles (1986) . Many of the new entrants existed only because the FCC 
mandated discounts on local phone network connection fees. Once these 
discounts were eliminated the smaller companies were too. This cancelling 
of discounts even hurt the larger competitors such as MCI Telecommunica-
tions (MCI) and Sprint because of its reduction of the competitors' price 
edge over AT&T. 
Judge Harold Greene conducted more than 18 months of hearings, 
pretrial discovery and major filings by the parties. Not until January 
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1981 did the trial begin (Enis and Sullivan, 1985}. William Baxter, the 
first Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust in the Reagan Administra-
tion negotiated the settlement with AT&T. It was argued that "consumers 
were forced to buy from the monopolist. Thus, if AT&T were able to 
exclude rivals or potential rivals as competitors, it would be in a 
position to raise and maintain prices above competitive levels" (Areeda 
and Turner, 1975, p. 697). Baxter said midway through the trial, "If one 
argues for divestiture, one argues that the cross-subsidy problem is 
terribly important, that the vertical integration economies probably are 
not very great, and that regulatory supervision is unwanted and more 
deregulation is possible". (U.S. Senate, 1981, p. 27). This cross-subsidy 
according to Temin and Peters (1985) , was the enabler and incentive for 
AT&T to subsidize its competitive long-distance services with revenues 
from its regulated local monopolies. Coincidently this was the solution 
prescribed by the Communications Act of 1934 for the ability to produce 
"universal service" (DeMott, 1983, p. 62). The Communications Act (Temin 
and Peters, 1985) had prescribed the use of high long-distance rates to 
subsidize local service in order to make the telephone service affordable 
to as many consumers as possible. 
As the case languished in the judiciary system it was apparent a 
settlement was needed and wanted on both sides. AT&T wanted to catch up 
with the communications revolution, especially in the computer field 
which it was unable to do because of its status as a regulated monopoly 
(Sloan, 1984). Competitors were anxious to get a bigger portion of AT&T's 
phone market (Temin and Peters, 1985). The Reagan Administration wanted 
it ended, too (Enis and Sullivan, 1985). On January 8, 1982, the Justice 
Department and AT&T came to an agreement to break up the Bell System. 
Charles L. Brown, AT&T's Chairman announced that the company had agreed 
to divest itself of the local telephone exchanges to settle the seven-
year-long antitrust suit. As Brown said, "We seized the initiative. We 
now have our fate in our own hands" (O'Reilly, 1983, p. 63). 
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The agreement was officially known as the Modification of Final 
Judgement in that it vacated and replaced the Final Judgement or Consent 
Decree of 1956 (Enis and Sullivan, 1985) . Besides having to divest 
itself, AT&T was prohibited from using the name Bell and forced to 
abandon the bell-shaped symbol that had identified it to the public for 
decades. O'Reilly (1983, p. 61) said, "The dismemberment dwarfs the 1911 
splitup of Standard Oil." AT&T executives had to devise new strategic 
planning guidelines, create new ventures, restructure the new 
organizations, and come up with new names to match. The chairman of one 
local Bell company said, "It's like taking apart a 747 in midair and 
making sure it keeps flying" (p. 62). 
The final outcome split the company into a national long-distance 
carrier (which kept the name AT&T) and 22 local operating companies, 
grouped into seven comparably sized Regional Holding Companies (RHCs) , 
better known as the Baby Bells (Lockwood, 1987). The regionals, under the 
agreement, may not manufacture telephones, switch-boards, and other 
"customer premises" equipment. In return AT&T was allowed into unregula-
ted endeavors such as the computer industry. 
Brown admits that the settlement with the government was a retreat 
from AT&T's longtime resistance to a breakup. "Divestiture was not our 
idea," he said, "and we think it is wrong from the standpoint of the 
country's interests" (DeMott, 1983, p. 62). But the alternative seemed 
bleaker: "Time was not on our side. The Government's determination to 
restructure the Bell System would have gone on for years, draining our 
energy and preventing us from planning our own future" (p. 62}. Rather 
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than cling to the past, Brown was eager to get on with the "exciting" 
task of building the new AT&T. It does not matter whether the company was 
never proven guilty or not, because as Brown said, "The ship has left the 
dock" (p. 62). While Brown states the feelings of the industry, Howard 
Anderson, a well-known authority in telecommunications research gives the 
consumer's viewpoint: 
The next five years will surprise us too. There will be price 
wars, a vast array of competing technologies and complex choices 
to be made. Consumers will benefit from the revolution with 
better service, cheaper prices and more control. Consumers will 
be the engineers of their own custom-designed communications 
centers (Wellborn, 1984, p. 61). 
In August 1983, Judge Greene gave final approval to the divestiture 
agreement. But what really led to this point? We know AT&T had wanted to 
expand into some unregulated industries and competition was wanted in the 
phone market both by AT&T's competitors and the government. We know that 
AT&T had become a monopolistic giant. But were there additional reasons 
which contributed to the breakup? Why did it happen? 
Why Did Divestiture Have to Happen 
After the government spent $400 million on an antitrust suit many 
people are still asking why the breakup took place? Why did the 
government force the divestiture of AT&T when according to Guinn (1984), 
we already had the best telephone system in the world? Toffler says the 
answer is simple: 
A telephone system, even if it is the best in the world, is 
simply not good enough ... Any country ... needs decentralized, high 
speed, high-capacity networks for moving vast amounts of compu-
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ter data, video images, and other kinds of messages, along with 
voice-to-voice telephone communications ... a truly 21st century 
communications system could not be built by an oversized, over-
centralized, overconstrained organization of the kind AT&T was 
before the great breakup (1985, p. 127). 
Although Toffler is not a telecommunications expert, he is well respected 
for his insight of future economic events, as depicted in his books 
Future Shock and The Third Wave, and for that reason his viewpoint is 
given. 
By 1970 the basic problem of AT&T was one of supply and demand; too 
much demand for new phone service and not enough AT&T facilities to 
accomodate all the new customers. The result had been horrendous delays 
and breakdowns. Many of its more powerful customers, according to Coll 
(1986), lashed back at AT&T, publicly criticizing, even ridiculing the 
giant monopoly for its arrogance and incompetence. This criticism 
startled the public, making them wary of AT&T's size. AT&T Chairman Brown 
disputes this incompetence statement. "If we're not competent," he says, 
"I wonder why the competitors are trying to get Congress and the Federal 
Communications Commission to restrict us in various ways. We must be 
making a mark somewhere, or the competition wouldn't be so frightened" 
(DeMott, 1983, p. 64). 
As was stated earlier, Vail and his successors believed that a 
monopoly in communications best served the public interest, but the 
government did not believe it (Enis and Sullivan, 1985), Their decision 
to break up AT&T was made ~s representatives of the public and hopefully 
as guardians of the public interest. Sivy (1986) said that lowering costs 
and increasing customers' choices were the ostensible justification for 
the breakup. A truer reason might be that the company's size and 
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monopolistic tendencies opened it to attack. Such tendencies involved 
putting pressure on banks to deny credit to the independents, and putting 
pressure on politicians to deny franchises or to grant them only with 
burdensome conditions attached (Seelman, 1984). These tactics caused the 
Bell system to be called a "ruthless, grinding, oppressive monopoly" 
(Baida, 1985, p. 73]. In the range of its influence, in assets, and in 
its impact on the daily lives of ordinary people, AT&T dwarfed not only 
other companies but also nations. 
To gain a better prospective of the company's size a few facts 
should be pointed out. By the end of the 1940s, AT&T had annual operating 
revenues of $2.9 billion (Bell, 1970). It employed more than half a 
million workers, paid $21 million in annual dividends to 83,000 share-
holders accounted for the lion's share of the market for all 
communications services, and was, by any measure, one of the largest 
private corporations in the world (Toffler, 1985). In 1950, there was 
only one primary communications manufacturer in the United States, 
Western Electric, with annual sales of $840 million (Bell). In 1972, AT&T 
owned more than 90% of outstanding common equity in 18 of the 21 
principal telephone companies (Toffler). At the time of the divestiture, 
AT&T had $155 billion in assets. It was bigger than General Motors (GM), 
Mobil, Ford, General Electric (GEl, International Business Machine (IBM), 
Xerox, Coca-Cola and Exxon combined (DeMott, 1983), and it was the second 
largest employer in America, behind only the government (Toffler) . 
Lockwood (1987) says the government was obviously worried by the 
size and power of the telephone giant, however, the antitrust suit 
revolved around two glaring abuses. One was that AT&T bought almost all 
the equipment needed from its own manufacturing subsidiary, Western 
Electric. The second abuse was that firms like MCI were not getting the 
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connections they needed, or were getting them only slowly and expensively 
(Lockwood, 1987). The government kept trying, through the FCC, to inject 
competition in a piecemeal fashion. Brown said, "We kept saying you can't 
inject little pieces of competition into a monopoly setup without realiz-
ing that there's going to be a major upheaval eventually" (Zuckerman, 
1984C, p. 59). This government goal to create competition for the purpose 
of regulating costs was apparently clear to AT&T. Charles Brown's 
question in August 1980, "Why are we fighting to keep our local 
monopoly?" preceded an obvious (to Chairman Brown) conclusion: 
If profit and loss in the phone industry now depended on costs, 
not regulatory accommodation, then the smart thing to do would 
be to jettison AT&T's most costly, least profitable subsidi-
aries, the local operating companies, and retain its high 
technology profit centers, Western Electric, Long Lines, and 
Bell Labs. The inter-intra split (Call, 1986, p. 274). 
DeMott (1983) concludes that the Bell System in the end, was done in 
by the rush of technology. The system 1 s structure could not contain or 
protect itself against better and cheaper ways of allowing people to 
reach out and touch someone. Toffler put it another way when he said 
AT&T's ability to make decisions " ..• by the book ... may well be disastrous 
in a novel, fast-changing environment in which the problems are 
themselves novel and fast-changing" (1985, p. 68). AT&T saw these 
problems coming and began to prepare for the new AT&T to emerge. 
No one individual can point to just one reason for why the 
divestiture took place. It was not because of the company's size, 
perceived incompetence, desire to lower costs and increase customer 
choices, or its inability to keep up with technology. Nor was it because 
AT&T was a monopoly, for, according to Enis and Sullivan (1985, p. 130), 
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"a monopoly alone is not per se unlawful. Monopoly power together with 
anticompetitive conduct is the essence of a Section 2 violation" of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act. And "if a dominant firm (such as AT&T) extends its 
market share by blocking or excluding competition through such 
anticompetitive practices as predatory pricing, lease-only policies, and 
exclusive buying arrangements it has crossed the line of legality" (Enis 
and Sullivan, 1985, p. 130). AT&T had been under scrutiny since the turn 
of the century, and in the end it took 35 years and two long lawsuits for 
the government to cut Ma Bell down to size (Baida, 1985) . Now we need to 
take a look at how these pieces landed and how the new structure appeared 
to consumers. 
Post Divestiture: The New AT&T 
January 1, 1984 the Modified Final Judgement took effect. At that 
time AT&T, the largest corporation in the world, was divided into eight 
companies, each of which had total assets of $14 billion or more. Guinn 
(1984) stated that when Forbes updates its lists of 500 largest U.S. 
corporations, these eight companies all will be in the top 10%. The new 
AT&T, the largest of the companies, with its approximately $35 billion in 
assets is still as big as Mobil, and twice as large as General Telephone 
and Electric (GTE), its nearest competitor. The physical_task of dividing 
the Bell System's assets among the new companies, from whole telephone 
exchanges down to trucks, repair equipment, paper clips and brooms was 
gigantic !Harris, 1985). Inside the operating companies the developments 
were just as bizarre (Zuckerman, 1984Al . Phone company officials in some 
old Bell System facilities set up barriers to separate operating company 
employees from those working for the new AT&T !DeMott, 1984). Said James 
Quinlan, plant manager for the newly formed Ameritech: "If the lawyers 
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had their way, this place would be divided up with six-foot concrete 
block walls and rolls of barbed wire on the top" (DeMott, 1984, p. 53). 
The looming post divestiture question was what was the new structure and 
direction of AT&T? 
"AT&T ... seemed to get the better end of the divestiture deal" 
(Harris, 1985, p. 98). As Harris points out, the new company structure 
was made up of five parts. The reconfigured AT&T's largest part consisted 
of the long-distance phone service division, an expanded version of the 
old Long Lines. Other parts are Western Electric, the large manufacturer 
that makes equipment for the telephone companies; Bell Labs, which serves 
the Bell System's research and development needs; American Bell, which 
markets equipment and communications services to business and residential 
users; and AT&T International, an overseas marketer of equipment and 
services. These divisions traditionally have generated, if only 
indirectly in the case of Bell Labs, about two-thirds of old Ma Bell's 
profits. In addition to receiving one-third of the assets and two-thirds 
of the revenues, AT&T is allowed to enter the market of most unregulated 
businesses such as the unregulated customer-premises equipment and 
computer services (Harris, 1985). 
It must be noted that although AT&T is no longer a monopoly and can 
compete freely in some fields, it will continue to be partly regulated. 
Intrastate long-distance rates and the fees paid to local phone companies 
that perform services for AT&T are regulated in each state by state 
regulatory commissions lEnis and Sullivan, 1985) . Interstate long-
distance rates are handled by the FCC (Hall, 1984). AT&T's competitors, 
by contrast, have relatively little regulation. While these aforemention-
ed unregulated fields are highly lucrative the long-distance service is 
still the backbone of the company and the turf AT&T must protect at all 
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costs (Gold, 1985) . This long-distance market has become a bruising 
battleground where a host of companies are trying to take business away 
from AT&T. Tradition bound Bell had to move fast to keep up with the 
increasingly competitive telecommunications industry. As one analyst 
said, "AT&T has to realize that they are in the real world" (DeMott, 
1984, p. 53). The most aggressive competitor has been MCI which, since 
1969, has been permitted by the FCC to offer long-distance service in 
competition with AT&~. However, Wasinski (1987) points out Wall Street 
and the media love AT&T in long-distance. 
The long-distance competitors have a slight edge on AT&T when it 
pertains to phone rates and the reason is simple. Cost of operating 
AT&T's long-distance business has risen because the firm now must pay a 
fee to the local companies that complete its calls, while competitors are 
not required to do so (Harris, 1985). In addition to this long-distance 
threat, the company found itself rapidly losing ground in its core 
business service. Business customers generate almost 60% of MCI's 
revenues, and a similar proportion of AT&T's (Lockwood, 1987). The large 
business customer base had been a monopoly for AT&T prior to the 
divestiture, but its competitors are now beginning to chip away at AT&T's 
stronghold. It must be understood though that even with an almost totally 
unregulated advantage, "AT&T's competitors face a Goliath possessed of 
universal brand awareness and the resources to spend hundreds of millions 
of dollars every year to enhance that awareness" (Welles, 1986, p. 53). 
Both MCI and U.S. Sprint chalked up heavy losses in 1986: MCI lost 
$448 million due to reorganization and the scrapping of analogue equip-
ment. In its first six months of existence, Sprint lost $356 million 
before taxes. AT&T, meanwhile, is quietly upgrading its own network. It 
spent $2.5 billion in 1987 while writing off $3.2 billion to cover 32,000 
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redundancies, resulting from the savings in manpower, and the scrapping 
of some old equipment. While AT&T strives to become more competitive in 
other markets, it can rely on steady growth of its long-distance 
business. There is a limit, however, to how well AT&T can do. Already the 
telephone side of the company is close to the new 12.7% ceiling set by 
the FCC for the rate of return on interstate calls. 
The most interesting competitive economic confrontation to come out 
of the telephone divestiture is the head-on confrontation between AT&T 
and IBM. AT&T was freed to enter the computer market in full force and 
was thought to have the size and resources to match IBM. But according to 
Gold, " ... AT&T is caught in the chicken-and-egg dilemma: It's hard to 
sell ... PCs because there's not much ... software. And there won't be much 
software until more ... PCs are sold" (1985, p. 190). Like most computer 
competitors, to help alleviate this problem, AT&T has followed suit and 
made their systems IBM compatible. Part of AT&T's computer problem was 
timing, it leaped into computer sales just as business was turning down 
(Sivy, 1986). Its computer operations lost at least $1 billion in 1986 
and analysts are asking whether AT&T will ever become the information-age 
titan envisioned after the breakup, or if it will remain little more than 
a huge phone company (Keller, 1986). Despite all these problems AT&T is 
going ahead in the computer field and expects to earn a profit by the end 
of 1988. Comments Jean Yates, Chairman of Yates Ventures Inc., a Palo 
Alto, California market researcher: "Judging from the company's 
performance thus far, I have no doubt that AT&T will be one of the top 
three computer manufacturers by 1995" (Harris, 1985, p. 100). Under new 
Chairman Jim Olson, AT&T has become an efficiently run telecommunications 
network. He accomplished this by cutting costs, strengthening their core 
businesses, and bolstering its growth in complete computer and 
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communications systems to U.S. and International customers (Huber, 1987). 
AT&T has adapted a classic marketing strategy of first underselling the 
competition and establishing a customer base then widening the product 
line. The government can continue to hold AT&T's profits down while 
trying to invoke competition, but they cannot alter the basic economies. 
of an industry which has enormous start-up costs and diminishing marginal 
costs, especially with new technology (Lockwood, 19871. 
"Charlie Brown brought the ship out of the harbor," says Robert J. 
Casale, a partner'at Kiddler, Peabody & Company and a former AT&T 
executive, "It's Jim Olson's job now to sail it" (Keller, 1986, p. 49). 
These words along with the following prophetic statement by former 
Chairman Brown reveal the real nature and structure of the "new" AT&T 
post divestiture: 
A new enterprise which will carry forward and build upon the 
character, the traditions, the achievements which Bell's 
invention, Vail's master plan and the Morgan group's money 
launched on a mission which proved so ambitious that its 
ultimate achievement-nearly a century later-came to be regarded 
by government authorities as an intolerable over-achievement 
(Tunstall, 1985, p. 73). 
The new AT&T was only part of this new enterprise. The other part 
consists of the seven Regional Holding Companies (RHCsl which we will now 
examine. 
The Regional Holding Companies 
Prior to divestiture there were 22 local Bell telephone companies 
operating under the AT&T mantle. Upon the breakup taking place, the 22 
companies were divided geographically and economically equal among seven 
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regional holding companies (RHCs), each with its own officers and boards, 
and each with responsibility for establishing the regional corporate 
' 
structure lEnis and Sullivan, 1985). The seven holding companies created 
by the AT&T divestiture were hardly struggling newborns (O'Reilly, 1983). 
Each RHC armed with years of experience in providing local phone service, 
began independent life as multibillion-dollar entities. As was stated 
earlier, all rank among the top 10 of Fortune 1 s 500, and the 
smallest of the firms, U.S. West, is larger than the nation 1 s biggest 
electric utility, Pacific Gas & Electric (Hall, 1984). The 22 local Bell 
telephone companies have continued much as before the breakup, collecting 
revenues from Yellow Pages, mailing bills to customers, and providing 
phone service in all states except Alaska and Hawaii, which have inde-
pendent firms (Hall, 1984). The RHCs are free to tread where no phone 
company had ever gone before, into almost any nonregulated business, 
except manufacturing telephones, certain kinds of information processing, 
and toll or long-distance services (Harris, 1985) . 
Although the seven regionals' assets, revenues, and customer bases 
are roughly the same, their history, geography, leadership, growth rates, 
and political and regulatory environments have stamped them with unique 
personalities (O'Reilly, 1983). As Bell planners expected the RHCs have 
to compete on cost, since most agree that neither AT&T nor the RHCs have 
a technological advantage. A brief synopsis of each RHC is necessary to 
get a full picture of the post divestiture telecommunication industry 
(Hall, 1984): NYNEX in the Northeast has 51% of AT&T's shares. BELL 
ATLANTIC is a tightly centralized company with seven local telephone 
companies in the Atlantic states and an aggressive taste for unregulated 
ventures_. ruiERITECH of the Midwest set the early profit pace, with the 
regionals' highest return on equity its first year of existence. Atlanta 
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based BELL SOUTH is the biggest RHC. SOUTHWESTERN BELL is the most modern 
of the seven but has been the most cautious in diversifying. U.S. WEST is 
the 14 state Western regional that spreads over 43% of the continental 
U.S. but holds a bare four percent of AT&T's shares. Finally, PACIFIC 
TELESIS, is located in high-growth areas with a subscriber base that is 
very receptive to new products and services, has been the least 
profitable Bell company. 
To open phone service to greater competition, the divestiture 
agreement provided that the regions be carved into geographical sections 
called local access and transport areas (LATA's). A regional is forbidden 
to carry traffic between the LATAs in its territory; that business is 
reserved for long-distance carriers like AT&T and MCI. Huber (1987) says 
the companies hate this present system, whereby they are obliged to hand 
over this long-distance traffic flowing within their territories. In 
addition to not being able to compete in this long-distance market, the 
RHCs also have lost subsidies from long-distance service. This loss of 
subsidies runs about $3.3 billion in revenues they formerly received from 
AT&T. Before the breakup about 37 cents from each dollar in revenues from 
long-distance charges was put back into the local companies. Now the RHCs 
get nothing. 
As regulated utilities operating in near-monopoly markets, the 
regionals, like the old AT&T, face little business risk. Shareholders 
thus can feel secure. Initially demand for the RHC's stock was weak, as 
investors preferred to gamble on AT&T's more glamorous, high-tech hopes. 
The regionals have been very steady though. Their high profits and 
rock-solid dividends have made them the clear stocks of choice for the 
conservative income-oriented investor who once found similar refuge in 
AT&T (Peavy and Scott, 1986). On average, the regionals now yield 8.2% 
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yearly dividends, nearly twice the rate of Standard & Poor 1 s 500 stock 
index (Peavy, 1986). For the moment the RHCs look far healthier than 
anyone else in the telecommunications business. While the rate of return 
they can make on their assets from local operations is fixed by state 
regulators, it averages 14% at the moment, comfortably above bank lending 
rates (Huber, 1987). 
This report has looked at the AT&T divestiture from the companies 1 
viewpoint thus far. We have implied how the consumer was affected. Now we 
will take a more indepth look at how the consumer was affected? 
Post Divestiure: How the Consumer Was Affected 
"The Bell breakup and its reverberations will have profound - and 
often uncomfortable - effects on every person who makes or receives phone 
calls in the U.S for the rest of this century" (Sloan, 1984, p. 79). One 
of the reasons for the Bell breakup was to create competition. The 
reasons why, how, and in what way competition was created have already 
been discussed in earlier chapters. Whether this competition really came 
about is still up for debate, but the breakup did create more players. 
Since the divestiture and the government's efforts to create competition 
in the telecommunications industry, about 350 long-distance companies and 
hundreds of manufacturers of telecommunications equipment have entered 
the race (Wasinski, 1987). The key for these competitors according to 
Wasinski " ... is to look as much like AT&T as they can in their business 
mix so that AT&T's price restructurings won't hurt them " (p. 20). 
The consumer was and still is concerned about the divestiture and 
its effects on them. The news media stressed the biggest impact to 
consumers is the telephone price changes. Dorothea White, 86, a widow 
living alone in Los Angeles worries: "I think it'll make my phone bills 
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go up. I don't really see why they had to break it up. It was a good 
system, and it seemed to be working" (DeMott, 1983, p. 61). In fact it is 
still a good system albeit a little more confusing. The consumer must 
recognize the relative economic value of being connected with the rest of 
the world, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (DeMott, 1983). Telephone 
service has always been one of the best bargains, in the home or office; 
price increases have lagged far behind inflation. Thomas Bolger, the new 
Chairman of Bell Atlantic, is fond of pointing out that the prices of 
other commonplace products like a Chevrolet have increased about 1000% 
since 1940, while the average basic monthly U.S. telephone rate has gone 
up from $3.67 to just $11.38 during that same period, or about 210% 
(DeMott, 1983). Phonefacts (1986) says that the best telephone service in 
the world has become so dependable that the consumer takes it for 
granted. Although this is an obviously biased source the reader would 
have difficulty finding many consumers that would deny this statement. 
Money (Sivy, 1986) interviewed specialists inside and outside AT&T, 
analyzed AT&T and its competitors, and examined obscure but vital phone 
company documents at state and local levels. 
Our conclusion: over the next decade, not only will phone bills 
on average be higher than they are now and service poorer, but 
also large parts of the nation's phone network seem likely to 
deteriorate to the point where they will be second rate, at 
least by the standards to which most Americans are accustomed 
(Sivy, 1986, p. 79) . 
Telephone rates have gone up for local service as have calls to distant 
points within states, along with what some consumers (DeMott, 1983) call 
sharp escalations in fees for local directory assistance, telephone line 
installation and pay telephones. In Pennsylvania, rate increases for 
l 
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local service rose from 12% to 45% in most areas. Residential rates in 
Kansas are $1.35 a month higher while in Baltimore they have gone up 
$4.67. Closer to home, fees for long-distance calls between Oklahoma 1 s 
two area codes have jumped 30% (Zuckerman, 1984B) . Nationwide the average 
residential phone bill is almost 20% higher since divestiture (Cooper and 
Kimmelman, 1986) . Cooper also says that unprecedented earnings and rapid 
equipment depreciation by the RHCs have resulted in excessive charges to 
local consumers of over $3 billion per year. 
Upon the breakup, the RHCs asked public utility commissions for huge 
rate increases, arguing that the loss of the national monopoly would 
increase the financial risk of telephone companies and that growing 
competition would expose them to even greater risk. Since the breakup, 
state regulators have approved rate increases for the RHCs resulting in 
about $5.5 billion in new revenue (Kimmelman and Cooper, 1986). These 
increases seem to be somewhat excessive for the consumer. With the 
general rate of inflation throughout the economy at less than nine 
percent since divestiture the overall local bills, including recurring 
monthly charges, local usage charges, phone costs and installation 
charges have increased four times faster than the general rate of 
inflation. The average total residential bill including all local and 
long-distance charges has increased more than twice as fast as inflation 
(Cooper and Kimmelman, 1986). Although these price increases are alarming 
to the consumer they are just the beginning of what the divestiture has 
done to the consumer. Possibly the clearest thing about the breakup of 
AT&T is the confusion. 
Most of the public was bewildered about the breakup. Polls conducted 
in 1983 showed that only one in five persons knew what was going to 
happen to the phone system (DeMott, 1983). William McKeever, telecommuni-
27 
cations analyst at Dean Witter Reynolds confessed: "Everybody is 
confused. The customers are thoroughly confused. The employees are 
confused. The companies are confused. So are the regulatory commissions, 
the unions and the stockholders. And so am I" (DeMott, 1984, p. 52). The 
biggest business change ever made in this country also touched off one of 
the biggest explaining jobs ever. To aid perplexed customers the local 
phone companies set up "Let's Talk" and "We Can Help 11 phone lines. 
Thousands of other people stood in lines at company offices, confused 
over everything from 'do they have to turn in their phones', to 'who do 
they call for service.' To add to this confusion is the billing process. 
Instead of receiving a single monthly bill for phone service, consumers 
may now get three or more: one for local service, another from one of 
AT&T's proliferating competitors for long-distance tools, and one from 
AT&T Information Systems for the lease of telephones. Another consumer 
problem is the service. "Out of all the assets of the Bell System ... the 
Spirit of Service may be the asset hit hardest by divestiture" (Baida, 
1985, p. 79). As has been already shown, one type of phone service has 
always helped pay for another. That kept phone costs down and within 
almost everyone's reach, but also led to price inequities. By 
redistributing funds to high-cost telephone service, the traditional 
separations and settlements process made possible universal service. Gold 
(1985) says that while MCI makes its sales pitch on the basis of price, 
AT&T continues to sell service and reliability. Some feel this service 
has changed, being somewhat less convenient and more depersonalized. The 
competitions' lower rates have lured away customers despite inferior 
connections, but people are willing to accept inferior service if it is 
cheap enough. But a recent Gallop Poll indicates though that most 
customers believe their local telephone company is providing high quality 
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service at reasonable prices (Phonefacts, 1987) . 
Another issue for consumers is equipment. The most common question 
asked early on was, 11 Do I have to buy my phone? 11 Consumers could 
either rent it or buy it from AT&T or turn it in and replace it with a 
phone from another supplier. Statistics show an increase in phone 
ownership from 20% in 1983 to 55% in 1986 (Phonefacts, 1986). At present, 
only the phone equipment market is fully competitive and totally 
deregulated. Customers can choose among scores of different phones at 
thousands of stores. As a result of this competition, variety has 
increased and price has decreased. With equipment comes failures and 
subsequent repairs. Consumers may not be aware that the local phone 
company will no longer come out to their homes and repair anything that 
is wrong with their telephone service free of charge. Unfortunately, many 
people discover this after they have paid $50 per hour to have a phone 
company maintenance person come to their home to tell them that the phone 
company can not fix the problem with their phone service. Consumers need 
to know that different entities are responsible for each different 
component of telephone service, and it is up to the local companies to 
provide this information to the consumer. 
Thanks to its reputation as a preeminently safe stock, AT&T was the 
most popular stock for small investors. The new AT&T, in contrast is a 
stock for investors who seek capital gains and are willing to gamble that 
the company can successfully make the transition from a regulated 
monopoly to a highly competitive enterprise (Chen and Merville, 1986). 
Whether the final price structure for AT&T will be competitive is left up 
to each consumer and investor to decide. As Zuckerman says, "It clearly 
is a more risky stock now" (1984C, p. 60). Peavy and Scott (1986, p. 268) 
states, "Before divestiture, the individual local exchanges (LECs) 
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usually received AT&T 1s Aaa/AAA bond ratings. After the divestiture, the 
LEC 1 s debt stands alone and ... the LEC 1 s were downgraded by both Moody 1 s 
and Standard and Poor (S&PJ . 11 On the other hand, the divestiture has been 
a stock market bonanza for the RHCs. From 1984 to 1986 RHCs stock prices 
increased by an average of about 90%, which is almost twice as fast as 
the Dow Jones industrial index, the New York Stock Exchange Index, and 
the Standard and Poor Composite Index (Peavy and Scott, 1986). Cooper and 
Kimmelman says 11 ••• this phenomenal performance is excessive and it has 
come at the expense of ratepayers 11 (1986, p. 13). The RHCs in defense of 
their high rates of return say it is because the current rates are only 
making up for regulatory lag (Kahn, 1983). However, as was shown earlier 
even though inflation has stayed relatively stable, their rising costs 
and subsequent rates have not. One of the reasons for these increases is 
the access charge. 
Most consumers did not know that prior to the breakup their local 
service had been subsidized by the long-distance profits. After 
divestiture to help make up for part of the loss of the subsidy, the 
customers pay local phone companies for access to long-distance lines. 
AT&T 1 s competitors also pay these charges, but their changes are 
discounted 55% (Enis and Sullivan, 1985). To justify the discount, the 
competitors use a multi-digit code to connect a telephone into a non-AT&T 
service. This access charge amounts to $2 a month for residential 
customers and $6 a month for a business line, regardless of whether they 
make or receive any long-distance calls. 11 In the event that the operating 
company is unable to produce the same quality or type of service as it 
does to AT&T, the access charge is to reflect this discrepancy" (p. 132). 
It is estimated that these access charges cost customers $3.3 billion a 
year which makes a sizeable impact on low-income people (Sivy, 1986). Two 
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studies, one in Pennsylvania, the other in Michigan, found that between 
two-thirds and three-quarters of all residential customers ended up with 
higher bills as a result of the imposition of the access charge (Cooper 
and Kimmelman, 1986). One way around the access charge, at least for the 
large volume consumer, is the bypass. 
AT&T, the RHCs and other firms vie for business where phone lines 
are in heavy use, and neglect areas where they are not. More and more 
large corporate phone users, disgusted with increasing rates and access 
charges, are building their own private data and voice networks, 
otherwise known as bypass. By building microwave dish antennas and aiming 
them at communication satellites, they can legally bypass public phone 
systems. When large users cast off the burden of helping pay for the 
local network by bypassing the facilities, the operating companies are 
forced to raise bills to small and individual consumers. "Estimating 
bypass is difficult, but most calculations show that it threatens 10-15% 
of the revenues of the local operating companies" (Huber, 1987, p. 20}. 
Because of these lost revenues prices are now being driven toward costs. 
"Basic phone service ... has never paid its own way" (Telecommunica-
tions in Transition, p. 3). Telephone service had been too cheap, for too 
long, with costs spread unevenly (Welles, 1986). Until the breakup, long-
distance rates were artificially high and helped subsidize local service. 
During the regulated monopoly era the rates were based on a phone 
company's average cost of serving customers, but now rates are based on 
what the traffic will bear above actual costs. So that costs would be 
paid by the consumer using the line, the FCC ordered a monthly charge, 
called a subscriber line charge, for local users. In conjunction with 
this charge the long-distance rates dropped correspondingly. There is 
also an-industry trend toward making consumers pay for each call. This is 
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already in place in some states as a low cost alternative and is called 
local measured service (LMS). This gradual transition to cost-based 
pricing has not set favorably with the consumer. As Guinn reports: 
Asking people to buy a service at just what it costs to provide 
it would ordinarily touch off a round of cheers from consumers. 
But not when they 1ve become accustomed to getting it far below 
cost. We seem to have conditioned Americans to believe there is 
a 'public right 1 to telephone service provided at less than 
cost (1984, p. 365). 
The local telephone service never has paid its own way (DeMott, 1983, 
Seelman, 1984, Baida, 1985, Enis and Sullivan, 1985, and Temin and 
Peters, 1985). The large rates of return of capital for AT&T was from 
long-distance service as well as the sale and leasing of equipment, which 
then subsidizes the local service. As a result of divestiture the 
consumer will have to bear the cost increase in order to retain 
"universal service" (Guinn, 1984) . 
"Despite the assumptions of the divestiture, long-distance 
telecomons cries out to be a monopoly" (Lockwood, 1987, p. 10). With the 
divestiture long-distance competition has become very aggressive (Sivy, 
1986) . Immediately following the breakup, the competitors were notorious 
for poor service, bad connections and multi-digit codes. They blamed 
their problems on AT&T saying they gave them poor-quality connections. 
H. Brian Thompson, MCI Senior Vice-President, said: "AT&T has the 
Cadillac. Our connections are a Chevette ... We have taken a lousy 
connection and made something of it" (Sivy, 1986, p. 82). On September 1, 
1986 the competitors were given equal access (Cooper, 1986), meaning they 
now have the same dialing procedure as AT&T, but their access discount 
was consequently cut. According to Huber (1987), the discount rates went 
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down from 50% to 5-15%. With this equal access and consequent discount 
reduction the competitors will now have to charge rates close to AT&T's 
to make profits, which is more bad news for the consumer. 
The last effect on the consumer deals with the low income subscrib-
er. Telephone bills are escalating, with dire warnings that the poor, the 
elderly, the handicapped, and many rural people may be forced to drop out 
of the network. There are consumer groups that support the formation of a 
national universal service fund (Cooper and Kimmelman, 1986) . Some states 
have lifeline rates which permit a very limited number of outgoing calls 
and an unlimited number of incoming calls for a small fee. The American 
Association of Retired Persons argues that LMS will prevent the elderly 
from using the telephone as a social instrument (Seelman, 1984) . The fact 
of the matter is that many consumers can not afford telephone service 
now, regardless of the purpose or need. In a door-to-door survey of low-
income residents in nine states and the District of Columbia, over one-
quarter of the households did not have phone service, and the vast 
majority stated that high cost was the reason. In California, a state 
with lifeline service for $1.50 per month, 28% of households surveyed 
still did not have service, but this time because many were unaware of 
the program (Gilbert, 1987). As we have seen time and time again, one of 
the most difficult groups of people to educate about phone service 
options are those households without telephones because they can not be 
reached through phone bills or customer mailing lists. Therefore, 
it would be up to the operating companies to initiate a program to reach 
these individuals and inform them of any changes. 
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CHAPTER III 
Summary and Conclusion 
Local phone service provides consumers with a vital link to their 
communities, families, friends, and crucial services. Indeed telephone 
service has probably become a necessity for the industrial nations to 
exist (Reinking, 1987). In the last few years, the telephone industry has 
undergone fundamental changes that have drastically affected all aspects 
of telephone service, however, AT&T still enjoys a virtual monopoly in 
the huge toll-free, big business, and overseas markets. In this author's 
opinion the divestiture may have even helped AT&T to retain a firmer 
grasp in these areas. Once AT&T was freed of having to service the local 
telephone market, they were able to streamline their operations, 
personnel, and maintenance, hence creating a more efficient network 
(Keller, 1985). Toffler (1985) had said that one of AT&T's problems was 
that it was too big to serve everyone effectively. The new pared down 
AT&T can concentrate on the services that have historically been their 
money makers (Coll, 1986), while making AT&T a more efficient telenet-
work. With this efficiency and reduction of obligation, rates should have 
gone down accordingly, b~t the rates still are not a bargain for some 
consumers (Cooper and Kimmelman, 1986). Analyst Fritz Ringling of Gartner 
Group Inc., a consulting firm, believes that AT&T will eventually become 
a "deregulated monopoly" that will, in effect, set prices and whose 
competitors "will exist only at AT&T's good graces because it doesn't 
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want another antitrust suit ... Competition as the FCC envisioned it hasn't 
worked 11 (Welles, 1986, p. 52). Consumers are seeing this presently in 
their rates. Reduction of long-distance rates have been more than offset 
by increases in local rates. AT&T by not having to subsidize local 
service is now able to channel their long-distance revenues into other 
business ventures. Because of this loss of subsidies, the local operating 
companies contend they need rate increases (Richardson and Grazer, 1987). 
"The new Bell companies managed to raise local rates and individual 
company profits sharply with arguments flatly predicting the most dire 
consequences from divestiture .. (p. 230). These increases took place even 
though they were directly contradicted by Judge Greene who said "there is 
nothing in the breakup that would dictate higher costs" (Barger, 1985, 
p. 64). So how was AT&T able to persua~e the regulators a rate increase 
was necessary? Two reasons: the language and numbers they used (Barger, 
1985) . AT&T and the Bell companies argued that "they had nothing to do 
with the breakup, that it was Washington's fault. And if we don't get 
higher rates, the best phone system in the world is going to deteriorate 
and so we need to have higher rates in order to maintain the quality of 
telephone service" (p. 165) . The companies also used overwhelming numbers 
like "the 1.7 billion dollar breakup, the 1 billion dollar a year 
construction program, and the 5.5 billion dollars in invested capital" 
(p. 165). Through intimidation the telephone companies are able to 
receive their increases while causing the consumer to seek assistance 
from consumer groups for help. Even though these increases may not seem 
significant to some middle class consumers, they are a definite worry to 
others (DeMott, 1983). 
In addition to retaining a firm grasp in the aforementioned areas, 
AT&T now is able to explore and invest in the computer industry, 
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satellite telecommunications, and a host of other ventures previously 
forbidden. These new industries help to add to the financial base of AT&T 
which aids its 1 research, resulting in newer technology. This steady 
income and constant upgrade puts added pressure on the other long-
distance companies to keep pace. "Fairly consistently over the last 
several years, public opinion polls have found that consumers believe 
that AT&T 1 s rates are between 18 and 20% more expensive than those of 
companies such as MCI and Sprint" (McEldowney, 1987, p. 53)'. To test the 
validity of the publics opinion McEldowney conducted a survey to compare 
what the total cost would be for 24 calls from various long-distance 
carriers. "The range between AT&T and the least expensive was only $1.25 
compared to $6.11 in May of 1985" (p. 53). 
"Dating back to 1-1-84, consumers have been confronted with having 
to make one decision after another about a service that they took for 
granted" (McEldowney, 1987, p. 52). Whether to lease or buy their phones 
"created a sense of uneasiness and even fear" (p. 52). Next, consumers 
had to select a long-distance carrier. Many were unsure how to choose a 
carrier and therefore took no action and let the local companies choose 
for them. The Bell operating companies were directed to send ballots to 
all of their customers but were not ordered to provide any comparative 
information or even any tips on what factors should be considered in 
picking a long-distance company. In addition no help is given the 
consumer on whether to choose a flat rate cost scale or use the local 
measured service (LMS) . "Complex LMS rate designs only add another kind 
of public confusion" (Richardson and Grazer, 1987, p. 232). This 
confusion prohibits some consumers from making the most cost effective 
choice for their means. The telephone industry wants desparately to go to 
the h~S system full time but is meeting strong resistance from the 
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consumer. "1985 was the target year for completing the successful 
nationwide implementation set in the 1970's by the old Bell System ... and 
only 2-4 percent of the residential customers have been added to the LMS 
roles in the past decade" (p. 230). "LMS success appears to require 
either eliminating flat rate options altogether or raising the flat rate 
to prohibitive heights" (p. 230). This author agrees with Reinking that 
"both flat and measured local telephone service should be provided. The 
consumer then has the individual choice and can match his or her purchase 
with the benefit received" (1987, p. 225). 
While consumers for the most part have learned to adjust, and in 
some cases, benefit from the changes in the industry, many consumers 
remain confused and uncertain about their new choices and obligations. As 
a consumer this author is still confused concerning the maintenance of 
the in-home telephone system, and would have to call the local exchange 
and ask for guidance as to whom to call for service and hope the 
information received was correct. Should the consumer have to worry about 
such things? This author says no. The local companies should provide this 
type of information in advance. "With varying degrees of success consumer 
groups around the country attempted to fill the vacuum" (McEldowney, 
1987, p. 52), but overall the consumer is probably still confused. 
Divestiture was supposed to hold great promise for telephone 
subscribers, but for most consumers that promise remains largely 
unfulfilled. The consumer still has one company for local telephone 
service, and even though there are a variety of long-distance companies 
to choose from, the prices do not vary a great deal. The days of price 
wars as consumers saw in the early days of divestiture are gone. The 
differences in the companies are only cosmetic, and superficial at best. 
Virtually every company now has fiber optics as well as other new 
telecommunications features, and as quickly as another new feature is 
developed, all the companies quickly have it. With all this new 
technology present there is still only a few practical substitute 
products for basic residence telephone service, i.e. CBs, ham radios, 
etc. 
The significance of the lack of substitutes for telephone 
service is merely to tie together the other aspects of demand. 
If there were reasonable alternatives for this necessary 
product, the policy issues would be simple - consumers would 
choose between the alternative products and competition would 
flourish (Reinking, 1987, p. 225). 
37 
So what advantage did the divestiture create? Simply, it attempted to 
breakup an illegal monopoly which was restricting competition although 
some people disagree. Former Senator Barry Goldwater, normally a fan of 
freer markets and less government regulation, said: "We're going to be 
sorry that we tampered with a system that was functioning well. I wish 
this divestiture had never happened" (DeMott, 1983, p. 60-61). This 
author disagrees though. The divestiture was needed and justified. 
Businesses should be alerted that they can not run rampant while failing 
to consider the effects they might have upon the consumer. The telephone 
industry has an obligation to provide good quality service at a fair 
price, and what that fair pr,ice will be is up to the consumer to dictate. 
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